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Abstract 
The issue of the use of fatal force by state actors and its compatibility with the state’s 
duty to protect life was given a high public and judicial profile in the recent Grand 
Chamber’s decision in Armani Da Silva v United Kingdom,1 involving the killing of 
Charles de Menezes in 2005 when he was mistaken for a suicide bomber some two 
weeks after the London bombings. Whilst that case provides the context for 
discussion on the use of fatal force, this article focusses on two recent High Court 
decisions - R (Davis) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis and R (Collins) 
v Secretary of State for Justice - that raised self-defence and the law’s compatibility 
with the state’s duty to protect life. The article proceeds by drawing out the facts of 
each case, then turns to the law of self-defence in English domestic law and its use in 
these two cases. It then examines the compatibility of both use of force by state actors 
in both Davis (and Da Silva), and the use of force by private homeowners in Collins, 
with art. 2 ECHR, and in particular whether the UK’s framework for self-defence is 
art.2 compatible. 
 
Introduction  
 
The issue of the use of fatal force by state actors and its compatibility with the state’s 
duty to protect life was given a high public and judicial profile in the recent Grand 
Chamber’s decision in Armani Da Silva v United Kingdom,2 involving the killing of 
Charles de Menezes in 2005 when he was mistaken for a suicide bomber some two 
weeks after the London bombings. Although this case did not consider the substantive 
issue of whether the force used in this case was ‘absolutely necessary’ as required by 
art.2 of the European Convention, or whether the operation was planned with 
sufficient care so as to satisfy the requirements of art.2, the Grand Chamber did 
comment on the compatibility of the UK’s law on self-defence, and was satisfied that 
it was consistent with art.2 despite domestic law not making reference to the words 
‘absolutely necessary’ employed in the Convention right to life.3 This case will be 
revisited later in this article, which is primarily concerned with whether domestic 
substantive law relating to self-defence is Convention compatible. 
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1
 (App. No. 5878/08); decision of 30 March 2016.  
2
 (App. No. 5878/08); decision of 30 March 2016. 
3
 The case will be considered later on in this article, when examining the decision in Davis, below. On 
the facts the Grand Chamber concluded that there had been no violation of art.2 as the authorities were 
found to have carried out an effective investigation into the shooting and that all aspects of the 
authorities’ responsibility for the shooting had been thoroughly investigated. 
Rather, this article focusses on two recent High Court decisions that raised self-
defence and the law’s compatibility with the state’s duty to protect life. In one 
decision,
4
 the court rejected a claim in battery and negligence brought by a person 
who had been shot by a police officer on the grounds that the officer was acting in 
self-defence and had not been negligent in using such force; despite errors having 
been made in the conduct of the police operation. This decision will be examined to 
see whether it is consistent with the European Court’s approach in this area and 
whether, in general, domestic law provides sufficient protection to the right to life 
protected under art.2. The High Court has also recently ruled on the compatibility of 
s.76 (5A) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2006, relating to the use of 
self-defence by householders in the protection of their property and themselves, with 
the state’s duty to protect life under art.2.5 This case involved the use of fatal force by 
one private individual against another, thus engaging the state’s positive obligation to 
protect individuals from attack, and human rights breaches, by other private actors, 
and raising the question whether the domestic law of self-defence is sufficiently 
sympathetic to the rights of the victim of such force so as to be compatible with the 
state’s positive obligation under the ECHR, together with the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights in this area.
6
 
 
Compatibility of domestic law with Article 2 
 
With the possible repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and its replacement with a 
British Bill of Rights,
7
 attention will focus on whether UK common law can 
accommodate the principles and requirements of the rule of law and relevant 
international human rights law. At present domestic law which impacts on these 
principles answers primarily to the rights contained in the ECHR).
8
 However, 
whatever the debate concerning sovereignty and the relationship between the 
Convention and domestic law, it is clear that the latter exists independently from the 
Convention and its rights, and must therefore be developed within the domestic legal 
system. Accordingly, attention is now focussed on the common law’s ability to 
accommodate principles of fairness, justice and respect for human rights; whether that 
is achieved, as presently, in the light of Convention rights, or under a proposed 
domestic Bill of Rights.  
 
The use of lethal, or potentially lethal, force by an officer of the state not only raises 
issues regarding self-defence in any criminal or civil proceedings, but also on whether 
such use of force is in violation of art.2 ECHR, which states that everyone’s life shall 
be protected by law.
9
 Article 2(2) requires the use of such force to be absolutely 
necessary in pursuance of any of the legitimate aims listed in that provision, including 
                                                 
4
 R (Davis) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 (QB)   
5
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 
6
 The domestic courts currently must take into account such decisions by virtue of s.2 Human Rights 
Act 1998. 
7
 See R Slowe  ‘The Conservatives proposals for  A British Bill of Rights’ [2015] EHRLR 372 
8
 As included in the Human Rights Act 1998, s.1 and Schedule 1 
9
 For an extensive coverage of Article 2 and its case law, see DJ Harris, M O’Boyle, EP Bates and CM 
Buckley Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3
rd
 edition (OUP 2014), chapter 5, and A 
Mowbray Cases, Materials and Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights, 3
rd
 edition 
(OUP 2012), chapter  4 
the defence of any person from unlawful violence.
10
 In addition, because art.2 
imposes a positive obligation on the state to protect everybody’s life from threats 
from other private individuals,
11
 any legal system must ensure its law complies with 
art.2 and the standards it lays down with respect to the use of lethal (or potentially 
lethal) force when that force has been used by non-state actors. Thus, relevant 
domestic law must provide sufficient protection to the individual against the arbitrary 
use of force and this requires an examination of whether any law of self-defence is 
sufficiently compatible with the standards contained in art.2.
12
 
 
Facts and decision in Davis 
The claimant had served a sentence of imprisonment for firearms offences, having 
waved a pistol at police while fleeing and fired it at the door to a block of flats. After 
his release, the police received information that he was planning a robbery and had 
been trying to acquire a gun. A team of specialist firearm officers was briefed and was 
told, erroneously, that the claimant had fired at police while committing the earlier 
offence. The claimant was subsequently placed under surveillance. One of the officers 
thought that he had seen him in a car with three others, fiddling with what appeared to 
be a gun in his waistband. The claimant and others were also observed attempting to 
start the car with jump leads. An armed officer approached the car and said that he 
saw a small black object with a square end; believing that a gun was pointing at him 
and that he was about to be shot. The officer shot the claimant, causing injuries, and 
no gun was found in the car. There was inconsistent evidence as to whether the 
claimant, who was a front-seat passenger in the car, had reached into the foot-well 
immediately before the shot was fired, and the defendant claimed that the small 
square black object was probably the end of the jump-lead handles. The claimant 
brought proceedings against the police for battery, negligence and breach of his right 
to life under art.2 ECHR. 
 
With respect to the claim in battery, in the High Court of England and Wales, Nicol J 
held that whether the officer who had shot the claimant had held an honest belief that 
he was in imminent lethal peril was a question as to his subjective state of mind, 
although whether any such belief was reasonable required an objective assessment.
13
 
In the court’s view, the two were not to be equated; if there was good reason why the 
officer might have had that fear that was a matter which might be relevant in deciding 
whether he did in fact have such a fear.
14
 On the evidence, there could have been no 
good reason for the officer to fire unless he feared for his life: he was an experienced 
officer who had undergone rigorous training and taken part in a large number of 
armed operations, but had never before fired his weapon. In addition he had many 
commendations for professionalism in tackling armed suspects and no disciplinary 
                                                 
10
 Article 2(2) allows such force in other stated circumstances, but the use of it in defending persons 
from unlawful violence, or effecting a lawful arrest as in Davis, below,  is at the centre of the issues 
dealt with in this article 
11
 Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245 
12
 See F Leverick, ‘Is English self-defence law incompatible with Article 2 of the ECHR?’ [2002] 
Crim. Law R 347 
13
 R  (Davis) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 (QB)  [29]  
14
 R (Davis) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 (QB) [62], applying 
Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex [2006] EWCA Civ. 1085; [2007] 1 WLR 398 
convictions.
15
 The officer believed that the claimant was a very dangerous individual 
and that he was in possession of a gun; the jump-lead handle could have been 
mistaken for a pistol. On the other hand, the claimant had a history of giving false 
information to the police and his evidence could not be accepted without reliable 
corroboration. Accordingly, the officer's belief that he was facing imminent lethal 
peril was a reasonable one and he had acted in lawful self- defence and the latter 
claim failed.
16
 
 
Dismissing the claim in negligence, it was found that there was no evidence from 
which it could be inferred that the police had assumed any kind of responsibility for 
the claimant.
17
 If that conclusion was wrong, the claimant would be entitled to say 
that the error in the briefing and the mistaken identification of the claimant as the man 
who had fiddled with his waistband were negligent, but those errors were not material 
because even if they had not occurred a decision would still have been made to deploy 
specialist firearm officers, in view of the evidence that the claimant had been trying to 
acquire a firearm, and because the officer would still have perceived that the claimant 
was pointing a gun at him.
18
 Turning to the claim under art.2, since the officer 
honestly and reasonably believed that he was about to be shot, the shooting itself did 
not amount to a breach of the claimant’s right to life. Although the materiality of any 
negligence on the part of the police was relevant to a claim under art.2, there was no 
material negligence either in the shooting itself or in the planning or conduct of the 
operation.
19
 
 
Facts and decision in Collins 
 
In this case the High Court was required to determine whether the so-called 
‘‘householder's defence’’ in s.76(5A) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008 was compatible with art.2 ECHR. The claimant had sustained serious personal 
injury after he had been forced into a headlock by a homeowner whose house he had 
broken into. A police investigation followed and the Crown Prosecution Service 
decided not to prosecute the homeowner. 
 
Giving judgment, Sir Brian Leveson P held that it was clear that the statutory 
provision adopted and preserved the second limb of self-defence at common law, 
therefore the central question was whether the degree of force used by a defendant 
was "reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be", and not 
whether the force used was proportionate, disproportionate or grossly 
disproportionate. In his Lordship’s view, the standard remained that which was 
reasonable, and the other provisions, in particular s.76(5A) and s.76(6), provided the 
context in which the question of what was reasonable had to be approached. 
20
 
 
                                                 
15
 R (Davis) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 (QB) [70] 
16
 R (Davis) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 (QB) [71] [97] 
17
 R (Davis) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 (QB) [118], following 
Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 and Robinson v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire  [2014] EWCA Civ. 15 
18
 R (Davis) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 (QB) at [139] 
19
 R (Davis) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 (QB) at [157], applying 
Nachova v Bulgaria (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 43 
20
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 at [18]-[20] 
His Lordship stated that the operation of s.76(5A) automatically excluded a degree of 
force which was grossly disproportionate from being reasonable in householder cases, 
but stressed that if the degree of force was not grossly disproportionate, s.76(5A) did 
not prevent that degree of force from being considered reasonable within the meaning 
of the second self-defence limb.
21
  On the other hand, the test did not direct that any 
degree of force less than grossly disproportionate was reasonable; whether it was 
reasonable would depend on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. 
Accordingly, s.76(5A) read together with s.76(3) and the common law on self-defence 
required two separate questions to be put to the jury in householder cases. Presuming 
that the defendant genuinely believed that it was necessary to use force to defend 
himself, those questions were: (a) whether the degree of force used by the defendant 
was grossly disproportionate in the circumstances as he believed them to be; (b) 
whether the degree of force used was nonetheless reasonable in the circumstances as 
he believed them to be.
22
 On the plain words of s.76, a jury should consider those 
questions disjunctively: the answer to the first question did not provide an answer to 
the second.
23
 The effect of s.76(5A) was to allow a discretionary area of judgment in 
householder cases, with a different emphasis to that which applied in other cases. In 
deciding whether the degree of force was reasonable, it was necessary to take into 
account the fact that a person acting in self-defence might not be able to weigh to a 
nicety the exact measure of any necessary action, and that evidence of a person 
having only done what he honestly and instinctively thought necessary to defend 
himself constituted potent evidence that the force used was reasonable.
24
 In almost all 
cases the degree of force used would be reasonable if it was proportionate, but that did 
not equate the two meanings because s.76(6) permitted a finding that force which was 
proportionate was nevertheless not reasonable.
25
 Consequently, in all those 
circumstances, the construction placed on s.76(5A) by the editors of Archbold 2016, 
namely that force in a householder case was only to be regarded as unreasonable if it 
was grossly disproportionate, was not an accurate statement of the law.
 26
 
 
The decisions in Davis and Collins and the domestic law of self-defence 
 
Self-defence, if raised successfully, permits the defendant’s use of force, including 
fatal or potentially fatal force and is referred to as private defence inasmuch as it 
includes the defence of others and prevention of crime.
27
 The defence can be broken 
down into two parts: a belief in the need for force in the circumstances; and a 
proportionate degree of force used in response to that threat. As the autonomy and 
right to life of individuals are in conflict, it is, therefore, essential that the law of self-
defence is sufficiently certain to act as a morally coherent guide, which rationalises 
the lawful use of lethal or potentially lethal force. 
 
                                                 
21
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 at [19] 
22
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 at [20] 
23
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 at [22] 
24
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 at [23] 
25
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 at [25] 
26
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 at [33]-[34] 
27
 Criminal Law Act 1967, s. 3(1): ‘a person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances 
in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected 
offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.’ 
The common law on self-defence was given statutory authority by s.76 of the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008; the political impetus for this legislation 
being the threat of prosecution that “heroes” - as opposed to “vigilantes” - were faced 
with in particular circumstances. It did nothing, however, to clarify the law that 
already existed, and the uncertainty with regards to the permissible degree of force 
remained the same. The following common law principles were included in the 
section:  
 
 the use of reasonable force is determined by the defendant’s perception of the 
circumstances (s. 76(3)), whether or not that perception was mistaken (s. 
76(4)); 
 this perception cannot depend on voluntary intoxication (s. 76(5));  
 the degree of force used will not be reasonable if disproportionate in the 
circumstances (s. 76(6));  
 the possibility that the defendant could have retreated is to be taken into 
account but does not give rise to a positive duty (s. 76(6A) is inserted by the 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s. 148);  
 the defendant may not be able to weigh the measure of the response to a nicety 
(s. 76(7)(a)); and  
 an honest and instinctive reaction is evidence of a reasonable response (s. 
76(7)(b)).  
 
Although there is nothing in s.76 to this effect, cases such as Chisam
28
 suggest that 
the need for force should relate to an imminent threat. Furthermore, in contrast with 
s.76(6A), Fiona Leverick argues that the defendant should be required to retreat, but 
‘only if an opportunity to do so actually exists.’29 At common law, the Court of 
Appeal, in Bird,
30
 had ruled that reference to a duty, as in Julien,
31
 was too onerous as 
this would conflict with the rule that a pre-emptive strike may be justified by the 
circumstances,
32
 although Andrew Ashworth believes that ‘it would be possible and 
desirable to have a law which imposed a general obligation to avoid conflict but, 
where this was not practical, authorized a pre-emptive strike.’33  
 
In response to the position of householders faced with trespassers in their homes, the 
Crime and Courts Act 2013 amended s.76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Act 2008. As a consequence, s.43 of the 2013 Act effectively means that 
disproportionate force may be reasonable, provided that it is not (under 5A) ‘grossly 
disproportionate in those circumstances.’34 Collins35 confirmed that s.76(3) 
maintained the common law requirement that the degree of force used must be 
objectively reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant subjectively believed 
                                                 
28
 R v Chisam (1963) 47 Cr App R 130. 
29
 F Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence (Oxford: OUP, 2006), p.71. 
30
 R v Bird [1985] 1 WLR 816 (CA). 
31
 R v Julien [1969] 1 WLR 839 (CA). 
32
 Beckford v R [1988] AC 130 (PC). 
33
 A Ashworth and J Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2013), p.125. 
34
 Section 43(2) requires the following insertion in s.76 of the 2008 Act: ‘Before subsection (6) (force 
not regarded as reasonable if it was disproportionate) insert– ‘(5A) In a householder case, the degree of 
force used by D is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances as D believed 
them to be if it was grossly disproportionate in those circumstances.  
35
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 
them to be. With regards to the objective element,
36
 the court held that 
disproportionate, but not grossly disproportionate, harm may be reasonable. This 
depends on the idea that proportionality and reasonableness are not synonyms and 
leads to two questions: what is the relationship between proportionality and 
reasonableness; and should there be a different test in householder cases? 
 
The common law authority for the subjective element - Gladstone Williams
37
 - has 
received positive judicial treatment, although there have been questions concerning 
the appropriateness of relying on the defendant’s genuine, but mistaken, belief.38 
Thus, a defendant cannot rely on voluntary intoxication,
39
 or insane delusions.
40
 
Leverick has suggested that a “‘good reasons’ standard” might make us more careful 
about our beliefs, but that those of us who make mistakes believe that we are acting 
reasonably.
41
 It should also be noted that in Harvey,
42
 the Court of Appeal approved a 
subjective test that took account of the danger in the circumstances; a direction that 
the defendant need only believe that the trespassers are burglars would appear 
insufficient.
43
 Mr Collins was found to have car keys and a mobile phone from the 
house on his person,
44
 and the witness statements suggested that he “was ‘very 
strong’, ‘putting up a good fight’, struggling ‘like mad’, ‘going crazy’ and ‘really 
fired up’.”45 As Ashworth indicates, the ‘acquittal of the householder in a case where 
physical violence has not been offered by the burglar may suggest that English law 
does not respect the right to life in art.2.’46 
 
In Collins,
47
 the court approved of the dicta of Lord Morris in Palmer,
48
 regarding the 
objective aspect of the test, namely that a defendant cannot ‘weigh to a nicety the 
exact measure’ of his response and that, if a defendant had ‘only done what he 
honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that would be most potent evidence 
that only reasonable defensive action had been taken.’49 Sir Brian Leveson P held that 
the standard is one of reasonableness,
50
 although it was suggested that the relevant 
section ‘automatically excludes a degree of force which is grossly disproportionate 
from being reasonable in householder cases.’51 Cranston J explained that a degree of 
force might be used ‘which is objectively disproportionate but which is reasonable.’52 
In deciding not to prosecute, the Crown Prosecution Service determined that the 
householder had used ‘“as much force as a man of his age, weight and fitness level 
could in order to try and control [Mr Collins] in the circumstances as [B] perceived 
                                                 
36
 R v Owino [1996] 2 Cr App R 128 (CA). 
37
 R v Gladstone Williams (1984) 78 Cr App R 276 (CA). 
38
 J Rogers, ‘Culpability in Self-Defence and Crime Prevention’ in GR Sullivan and I Dennis, Seeking 
Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012). 
39
 R v Hatton [2005] EWCA Crim 2951, [2006] 1 Cr App R 16. 
40
 R v Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725, [2014] 1 All ER 902. 
41
 See fn. 24, 193. 
42
 R v Harvey [2009] EWCA Crim 469, [2009] All ER (D) 125 (Apr) (CA). 
43
 R v Yaman [2012] EWCA Crim 1075, [2012] Crim LR 896 (CA). 
44
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 [4] (Sir Brian Leveson P) 
45
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 [8] 
46
 See fn. 28, 118. 
47
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 
48
 Palmer v R [1971] All ER 1077 (PC) 
49
 Palmer v R [1971] All ER 1077 (PC) [1078] (Lord Morris) 
50
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33[18] 
51
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 [19] (Sir Brian Leveson P) 
52
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 [72] 
them to be. Consequently the force used might have been considerable, yet still 
reasonable.”53 
 
In what sense can the force be objectively disproportionate yet reasonable? Elsewhere 
in the criminal law, proportionality has been described as a ‘vague’ concept, but one 
that may nonetheless compare to one step up in a ladder of offences against the 
person.
54
 The person acting in self-defence may not be able to weigh his or her 
response exactly, but does killing someone in circumstances which only suggest 
actual bodily harm is necessary mean that the defender has acted honestly and 
instinctively? As Ashworth notes, ‘Forfeiture of life to protect a person from some 
minor hurt, loss, or damage would promote the value of honour above respect for life 
and limb.’55 Further, Catherine Elliott has argued that “reasonableness” is 
synonymous with proportionality and that in accordance with the rule of law the 
statute should not be interpreted literally,
56
 as in Collins.
57
 
 
In Davis,
58
 the Criminal Law Act 1967, s.3(1),
59
 was relied on by counsel for the 
respondent, but Nicol J held that the officer’s evidence was clear and that the firearm 
was discharged ‘to defend himself.’60 The officer discharged his firearm in the belief 
that “‘a gun was pointing at [him].’’61 In terms of a defendant’s honest, but mistaken, 
belief in this context, it was held in Martin (Anthony)
62
 that evidence of a defendant’s 
physical attributes may be admissible. By analogy, a trained firearms officer would 
not be expected to perceive the danger of any given set of circumstances in the same 
way as a householder faced with an equivalent threat. Leverick has pointed out that, 
where state actors are concerned, “the European Court has consistently held that … 
any mistaken belief of fact must be held ‘for good reasons’.”63 However, Ashworth 
considers that Bubbins v United Kingdom
64
 softened this requirement by stressing the 
genuine belief of the police officer at the time of shooting.
65
 Nicol J held that there 
was not only an honest, but a reasonable,
66
 belief on the part of the officer that Mr 
Davis was pointing a gun at him,
67
 which meant that ‘the shooting itself did not 
amount to a breach of art.2.’68 
 
                                                 
53
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 [7]. 
54
 A Ashworth, “A Change of Normative Position: Determining the Contours of Culpability in 
Criminal Law” (2008) 11 New Crim L Rev 232, 252. 
55
 See fn. 28, 118.  
56
 C Elliott, “Interpreting the contours of self-defence within the boundaries of the rule of law, the 
common law and human rights” (2015) 79 J Crim L 330, 334. 
57
 R (Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 33 
58
 Davis v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 
59
 See fn. 22. 
60
 Davis v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 [39]. 
61
 Davis v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 [18]. 
62
 R v Martin (Anthony) [2001] EWCA 2245; [2003] QB 1. 
63
 See fn. 24, 190. 
64
 (2005) 41 EHRR  24. 
65
 See fn. 28, 127. 
66
 Davis v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 [30]: ‘For the purposes of a 
civil claim, the position is different. There will only be a defence if the defendant honestly and 
reasonably believed he was in imminent danger.’ 
67
 Davis v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 [63]. 
68
 Davis v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 38 [153]. Note, the planning 
and conduct of the operation was equally held not to have breached art.2, at [154]. 
In terms of the reasonableness of the officer’s force, it was held that ‘his single shot at 
Mr. Davis could not possibly be said to be a disproportionate response.’69 Nicol J 
recognised that the defendant ‘cannot be expected to fine tune their reaction with 
absolute precision.’70 The officers had been briefed that “they could only open fire 
‘when absolutely necessary’.”71 
 
It is difficult to reconcile the idea that, in practice, firearms officers may only be using 
strictly proportionate force, whilst householders can use disproportionate force, even 
against non-criminal trespassers.
72
 Elliott rightly argues that the special householder 
test contravenes the principle of equality before the law.
73
 This is compounded by the 
idea that the belief in the need for force has to have “good reasons” where firearms 
officers, but not householders, are concerned. It is suggested that the significant factor 
in assessing reasonableness, or proportionality, should be the danger in the 
circumstances, and not the status of the defendant. 
 
The use of force by state actors and Article 2 ECHR: the decision in Davis  
At the heart of the claim in Davis is the argument that the police officer used force 
which had not been absolutely necessary in the circumstances and that the domestic 
law of self-defence allows the use of force which does not meet the test of absolute 
necessity laid down in art 2. Article 2(2) provides that the deprivation of life shall not 
be regarded as inﬂicted in contravention of art.2 when it results from the use of force, 
which is no more than absolutely necessary in defence of any person from unlawful 
violence and in order to effect a lawful arrest.
74
 Thus, for this exception to apply there 
should exist the most exceptional circumstances, and in McCann v United Kingdom,
75
 
the European Court stated that the term indicated that a stricter and more compelling 
test of necessity must be employed than, for example, deciding whether an 
interference with freedom of speech is necessary in a democratic society under 
art.10(2).
76
 
 
Significantly, the Court in McCann believed that the test in the relevant domestic law 
of self-defence – that the force used was reasonably justiﬁable77 – was not 
inconsistent with the test of absolute necessity employed in art.2(2). Although, in the 
Court’s view, the tests looked different on paper, the application of the domestic test 
did not reveal any inconsistency with the art.2 test and required suitably strong 
justiﬁcation for force that takes a person’s life.78 Thus, although it has been argued 
that domestic law is inconsistent with art.2 and that the European Court in McCann 
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suggested that an honest belief must be based on objective reasons,
79
 it is now 
accepted that the domestic tests are not inconsistent with the test of absolute necessity 
in art.2(2).
80
 This was accepted by his Lordship in the present case when he stated that 
the European Court had accepted that as far as this aspect of art.2 was concerned, the 
test was the same as English law, in the necessity to show that the person who used 
the force honestly and on reasonable grounds believed that he was in imminent 
danger.
81
  
 
It is clear however, that the test has a subjective element, and in the present case his 
Lordship stressed that the exceptions in art.2(2) required, in part, consideration from 
the perspective of the state agent who actually used the force. Consequently, such 
force will be treated as absolutely necessary if he honestly and on reasonable grounds 
believed that he was in imminent danger, even if that belief turns out to have been 
mistaken.
82
 Thus, his Lordship quoted from the Court’s judgment in McCann, where 
it noted that to hold otherwise would be to impose an impossible burden on the state 
and its law enforcement personnel in the execution of their duty to protect their lives 
and those of others.
83
  
 
It must also be noted that the European Court has tended to draw a distinction 
between the actual use of force by the state agent, and the planning of any operation 
preceding the use of force; the Court giving greater discretion to the former, and being 
more willing to interfere if an error occurs because of a failure to carry out a proper 
investigation into the facts, or to plan the operation with due care.
84
 Despite this 
distinction, the Strasbourg Court has been sensitive to the needs of law enforcement 
personnel to operate effectively, and in Bubbins v United Kingdom,
85
 although it 
found that various steps could have been taken, or taken differently, it found that none 
of them would have been likely to have made a difference, stressing that the incident 
was relatively brief and was fraught with risk and that during that time operational 
decisions had to be made as the situation evolved and more information became 
available.
86
 In Bubbins, it was also stressed that it was relevant that a law enforcement 
operation had been carried out which was regulated by domestic law and containing a 
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system of safeguards to prevent the arbitrary use of unlawful force.
87
 His Lordship 
thus stressed that although the European Court may be critical of some aspects of the 
operation, it will not find a violation if it is satisfied that, in general, the operation was 
conducted in a manner which was reasonable in the circumstances.
88
 
 
The High Court also rejected the argument that for the purposes of the art.2 claim it 
was not necessary in this case to prove a causal link between the failures in planning 
and control of the operation on January 29, 2009.
89
 Dismissing this argument, his 
Lordship held that such an argument only applied with respect to the Osman duty,
90
 
which was imposed where the authorities knew or ought to have known of a real and 
immediate threat to life.
91
 Accordingly, his Lordship held that the materiality of any 
negligence on the part of the police was relevant to the art.2 claim.
92
  Applying those 
principles to the facts, his Lordship found that the officer reasonably and honestly 
believed that he was about to be shot, and there had been no material finding of 
negligence in respect of the planning and conduct of the operation.
93
 
 
The use of fatal force by state actors and the decision in Da Silva v United 
Kingdom 
 
The recent high profile Grand Chamber decision in Armani Da Silva v United 
Kingdom
94
 has excited judicial and public debate surrounding the use of fatal force by 
state actors and the need to control the arbitrary use of such powers. In this case, the 
Grand Chamber found that the shooting of a Brazilian tourist in 2005 did not involve 
a violation of the state’s art.2 obligations. Jean Charles de Menezes, a Brazilian 
national, was shot dead by two special firearms officers after he was mistakenly 
identified as a suicide bomber, the shooting taking place two weeks after the London 
bombings and the day after unexploded bombs had been found on the London 
underground and on a London bus. Two terrorist suspects lived at the same address as 
de Menezes, and believing that he was one of them, he was followed by surveillance 
officers. The firearm specialists were deployed to help the surveillance team in 
stopping the suspects from leaving the address, but were not deployed in time. When 
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they arrived at the underground station they followed him on to the train, pinned him 
down and shot him several times in the head. The case was brought by the victim’s 
cousin who complained that the state had not fulfilled its duty to ensure the 
accountability of its agents for his death, because the ensuing investigation had not led 
to the prosecution of any individual officer. 
 
Although that case was primarily concerned with the state’s procedural obligations – 
the failure to bring effective criminal proceedings against the officers - the Grand 
Chamber endorsed the domestic law of self-defence. Finding that the test in England 
and Wales was not significantly different from the standard applied under the 
Convention it held: 
 
‘In both instances the focus was on whether there existed an honest and 
genuine belief that the use of force was necessary and the reasonableness of 
that belief was relevant to the determination of whether it was honestly and 
genuinely held. In any case, all the independent authorities considering the 
actions of the two SFOs responsible for the shooting had carefully examined 
the reasonableness of their belief that Jean Charles de Menezes had been a 
suicide bomber who could detonate a bomb at any second.’95 
 
This was accepted by his Lordship in Davis, when he stated that the European Court 
had accepted that as far as this aspect of art.2 was concerned, the test was the same as 
English law, in the necessity to show that the person who used the force honestly and 
on reasonable grounds believed that he was in imminent danger.
96
  Thus, in Armani 
Da Silva the Grand Chamber accepted that UK domestic law in this area was 
Convention compliant despite the difference in the wording of the domestic 
provisions in comparison to art.2: 
‘…the focus of the test for self-defence in England and Wales is on whether  
subjective reasonableness of that belief (or the existence of subjective good 
reasons for it) is principally relevant to the question of whether it was in fact 
honestly and genuinely held. Once that question has been addressed, the 
domestic authorities have to ask whether the force used was “absolutely 
necessary”. This question is essentially one of proportionality, which requires 
the authorities to again address the question of reasonableness: that is, whether 
the degree of force used was reasonable, having regard to what the person 
honestly and genuinely believed…So formulated, it cannot be said that the test 
applied in England and Wales is significantly different from the standard 
applied by the Court. ..Bearing in mind that the Court has previously declined 
to find fault with a domestic legal framework purely on account of a 
difference in wording which can be overcome by the interpretation of the 
domestic courts…it cannot be said that the definition of self-defence in 
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England and Wales falls short of the standard required by Article 2 of the 
Convention.
97
 
The decision in Da Silva with respect to the procedural aspects of art.2 is also 
important with respect to the UK’s overall compliance with the framework obligation 
under art.2, which in combination with the substantive limitations on the use of fatal 
force ensures that an individual’s life is protected from arbitrary and unnecessary 
interference. In this case, the Grand Chamber held that the evidential test employed 
by the CPS in deciding whether to prosecute – whether there was sufficient evidence 
against any individual officer to prosecute – was within the state’s margin of 
appreciation and that the test was not arbitrary, having been the subject of frequent 
reviews, public consultations and political scrutiny.
98
 The Grand Chamber’s flexible 
approach on these issues, including its rejection of the argument that only criminal 
prosecution for homicide would meet the requirements of art.2, suggest that had the 
substantive issue of whether absolutely necessary force was used been live in the 
proceedings, it would have offered a similar margin of appreciation to the authorities 
in those circumstances. 
 
The law of self-defence, article 2 and the use of force by private householders: 
the decision in Collins 
 
The human right’s claim in Collins concerned the state’s framework obligation under 
art.2(1) to ensure that its legal and administrative framework provides adequate 
protection to the right to life, and in this case whether the domestic law on the use of 
force by householders effectively deterred offences against the person in such cases. 
The Strasbourg Court has established that this duty involves having in place 
appropriate laws imposing criminal liability for acts which threaten the right to life 
and proper procedures to ensure that persons are deterred from committing such acts 
and are sanctioned for breaches of such laws, thus ensuring that such risks do not 
materialise.
99
 This ‘framework obligation’ can then be used to judge the compatibility 
of s.76 with art.2, and to decide whether the criminal law of England and Wales 
effectively deterred offences against the person in householder cases.  
 
In the present case his Lordship noted that in Makaratzis v Greece,
100
 the Court had 
held (in the context of judging the acts of state officials) that unregulated and arbitrary 
action by state agents is incompatible with effective respect for human rights, and that 
police operations must be regulated within a system of adequate and effective 
safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse of force.
101
 Thus, a legal and administrative 
framework should define the limited circumstances in which law enforcement 
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officials may use force and firearms.
102
 However, his Lordship stressed that the 
framework obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an 
impossible burden on authorities, allowance being made, therefore, to the difficulties 
in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the 
operational choices that must be made in terms of priorities and resources.
103
 This 
reflects the cautious approach taken by the Court in various aspects of the state’s 
positive obligations under art.2,
104
 and this hands-off approach has been employed in 
subsequent cases, both in the domestic courts and by the Strasbourg Court.
105
 
 
Despite this cautious approach, his Lordship noted that operation control is 
fundamental, and must ensure that the operation was regulated and organised in such 
a way as to minimise to the greatest extent possible any risk to life;
106
 although his 
Lordship stressed that the emphasis in respect of the framework is on reasonable 
safeguards, not on the regulation of such detail as to minimise to the greatest extent 
possible any risk to life or risk of ill-treatment.
107
 His Lordship also noted that the 
framework obligation is flexible, requiring different standards from context to 
context,
108
 and that where the act of force has been carried out by a non-State actor, 
the strict proportionality test used in art.2(2) cases was not appropriate.
109
 
 
His Lordship then considered the extent to which the margin of appreciation would be 
available to the state when judging its framework duty, noting that in MC v 
Bulgaria,
110
 the Strasbourg Court stressed that in respect of the means to ensure 
adequate protection to individuals against, in this case rape, States undoubtedly enjoy 
a wide margin of appreciation and that perceptions of a cultural nature, local 
circumstances and traditional approaches are to be taken into account. His Lordship 
also noted that there was no evidence of a convergence between ECHR states as to the 
law on self-defence, and in particular, in householder cases; adding that in the absence 
of such the definition of self-defence in such cases may well lie within states’ margin 
of appreciation.
111
  
 
His Lordship noted that the essential, simple, question was: does the criminal law 
effectively deter offences against the person in householder cases? Having accepted 
that s.76(5A) excluded the use of force which was grossly disproportionate, read in 
the light of s.76(6) which in non-householder cases excluded disproportionate force, 
his Lordship held that the effect of s.76(5A) was not to give householders a carte 
blanche in the degree of force they used against intruders in self-defence, and that a 
jury ultimately had to decide whether the householder's actions were reasonable in the 
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circumstances as he believed them to be.
112
 A jury might consider the actions of a 
householder in self- defence to be more than what might objectively be described as 
the minimum proportionate response, but nevertheless reasonable given the particular 
and extenuating circumstances of the case. That did not weaken the capacity of 
domestic criminal law to deter offences against the person in householder cases: a 
householder would only be able to avail himself of the defence if the degree of force 
used was reasonable in the circumstances as he believed them to be.
113
 Consequently, 
although his Lordship stated that it was not irrelevant that the householder's art.2 and 
8 (private and home life) rights were engaged, he stressed that the Strasbourg Court 
had consistently held that the reasonableness limb of self-defence as applied in state 
actor cases was compatible with the requirement of "absolute necessity" in art.2(2).
114
 
In those circumstances, therefore, there were reasonable safeguards against the 
commission of offences against the person in householder cases, and the criminal law 
on self-defence in householder cases fulfilled the framework obligation under art.2(1). 
 
Conclusions 
 
With respect to the art.2 claims, both decisions reflect the largely cautious approach 
of the Strasbourg Court in judging the state’s framework obligation under art.2(1) and 
the absolute necessity of the state actor’s actions under art.2(2). In particular, in 
Collins, the court made it clear that in cases involving private individuals the duty of 
the state under art.2(1) is more circumscribed and that the framework obligation is 
limited by the reluctance of the Court to impose impossible burdens on the state. In 
addition it is accepted that the margin of appreciation should be employed in these 
cases so to allow the courts to accommodate cultural perceptions, local circumstances 
and traditional approaches when judging the law and it application in particular 
circumstances. In this respect, the domestic courts have noted the lack of common 
European standards on the law relating to self-defence and its use by home owners, 
thereby encouraging deference to the institutional competency of both the law makers 
and the interpreters of such laws. 
 
The wide interpretation given by European and domestic courts to the need for 
‘absolutely necessary’ force under art.2(2) does nothing to remedy the interpretation 
of reasonable force in domestic law. The statutory provision provided for by the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 did nothing to clarify the degree of 
permissible harm, and the exception made for householders under the Crime and 
Courts Act 2013 only obscured the issue. A margin of appreciation is necessary 
inasmuch as the domestic law in relation to private individuals and state actors cannot 
be easily reconciled. However, a sound reason for the permissible degree of force to 
vary according to the status of the defendant, rather than the danger of the 
circumstances, has yet to be given. Until these are forthcoming, no principled 
assessment of the adequacy of these right-to-life safeguards can be made. 
 
With respect to Davis, the decision again reflects the deference shown by the 
Strasbourg Court to state actors when employing lethal force in particular 
circumstances, and to a lesser extent, in the planning of such operations. In such 
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cases, it is unlikely that the courts will question the actions of state authorities to use 
such force, despite art.2(2) insisting that any such force has to be no more than 
absolutely necessary. In these cases, therefore, challenge to such actions is severely 
circumscribed by deference and by the acceptance of institutional competency, and in 
the recent case of Armani da Silva v United Kingdom, 
115
 the Grand Chamber noted 
that it was particularly significant that the Court has never found that a person 
purporting to act in self-defence honestly believed that the use of force was necessary 
but proceeded to find a violation of art.2 on the ground that the belief was not 
perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time.
116
 
 
This approach protects such bodies in the performance of their duty to ensure public 
and their own safety, but at the same time dilutes in practice the state’s obligation to 
prevent arbitrary and unnecessary deaths and other harm. More generally, the 
decisions confirm that both the domestic courts and the Strasbourg Court are satisfied 
that the statutory and common law tests applied in domestic law are consistent with 
the obligations imposed under both art.2(1) and the requirement of absolutely 
necessary force under art.2(2). Consequently, the domestic courts are satisfied that 
domestic laws on self-defence - including those relating to the use of force by house 
holders - provide adequate safeguards in protecting individuals from arbitrary use of 
lethal or potentially lethal force. 
 
Underlining these issues is the idea that the domestic law is insufficiently certain from 
a rule of law perspective: the question of reasonableness is resolved in the jury room 
or through prosecutorial discretion, without the guidance of any criterion for 
determining proportionality. It is surely a matter of time before this uncertainty leads 
to the conviction of a private individual or state actor in circumstances which engage 
art.7 of the European Convention, which prohibits retrospective criminal law.
117
 This 
begs the question: is the permissible degree of force sufficiently certain to allow a 
private individual or state actor to avoid conviction? At present, the common law 
complies with the standards laid down by the Convention largely because of the 
generous and deferential approach adopted by the Strasbourg Court in this area. 
However, the fact that domestic law appears to pass muster with the Court should not 
prevent the common law from endeavoring to ensure that the law is compatible with 
basic standards of international human rights law and British notions of justice and 
foreseeability. 
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